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LIMITED TIMES: 
RETHINKING THE BOUNDS OF 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
KEVIN A. GOLDMAN†
INTRODUCTION 
No one born in the last eighty years has seen an original work cre-
ated in her lifetime fall into the public domain.1  Each time the term 
of copyright protection has been due to expire, Congress has passed 
another extension.2  This has led some scholars to suggest that Con-
gress is effectively granting these works a perpetual copyright, in viola-
tion of the Constitution’s requirement that such protection only be 
granted for “limited Times.”3  Although the Supreme Court has re-
† A.B. 1999, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Pennsylvania.  
I am grateful to Rachel Brodin, William Bryson, David Castleman, Seth Kreimer, 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Robert Potter, Kermit Roosevelt, Jake Shields, and Polk Wag-
ner for providing useful suggestions and thoughtful criticism.  Any errors and opinions 
are mine alone. 
1 More precisely, no work has fallen into the public domain so long as the copy-
right holder maintained her exclusive rights.  Any pre-1976 Copyright Act works whose 
initial twenty-eight-year term of protection expired might have passed into the public 
domain if the copyright holder chose not to exercise the renewal option.  See Act of 
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (providing for a twenty-eight-year term 
of protection for copyrighted works and a twenty-eight-year renewal term) (repealed 
1976); see also Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)) (instituting terms of copyright protection that 
extend for the life of the author plus fifty years for works created on or after January 1, 
1978).  But see Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264, 266 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000)) (making copyright renewal auto-
matic for copyrights in their first term on January 1, 1978).  Similarly, copyright owners 
are free to submit their works to the public domain prior to their expiration.  See, e.g., 
Creative Commons, Public Domain Dedication, http://creativecommons.org/ 
licenses/publicdomain/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (providing a model license whereby 
a copyright owner may release a protected work into the public domain). 
2 By some counts, this has occurred eleven times since 1962.  See LAWRENCE LES-
SIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 134 (2004) (“Eleven times in the last forty years, 
Congress has extended the terms of existing copyrights . . . .”). 
3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); Brief for Pe-
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jected this argument as applied to the current framework,4 the consti-
tutionality of future, more dramatic extensions remains an open ques-
tion.  Moreover, given the singular trajectory of congressional action 
towards ever-increasing duration, an eventual collision with the outer 
bounds of “limited Times” seems likely.  This Comment argues that, 
rather than resisting this trend, Congress should instead follow the 
progression to its natural conclusion and enact a regime of indefi-
nitely renewable copyright. 
Such a suggestion is anathema to the many scholars who view the 
ultimate expiration of copyright as a public entitlement and the re-
peated copyright extensions by Congress as perpetually depriving the 
public domain.5  Yet this conception of the public domain is unduly 
narrow.  Rather than viewing these extensions as Lucy continually 
pulling the football away just as Charlie Brown is about to kick it, con-
sider instead the similar case of a young child learning to swim.  Her 
father takes a step deeper into the water and says, “Swim to me.”  Just 
as she is about to reach him, her father moves farther back and says 
again, “Swim to me.”  This process is repeated until the child discovers 
that she is able to swim on her own, and thus, the tool she thought she 
needed (the safety of her father’s arms) is in fact no longer required. 
In a similar fashion, current copyright law gives artists substantial 
freedom to appropriate from a protected work at the moment of its 
creation, via doctrines such as fair use6 and the idea/expression di-
chotomy.7  It is, of course, impossible to know how life would have 
been different if revisions to the law had not allowed copyright owners 
titioners at 18-32, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (arguing that 
Congress’s attempt to extend copyright protection retroactively violates the Constitu-
tion’s “limited Times” provision). 
4 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193-94 (holding that Congress did not violate the “limited 
Times” constraint by enacting a statute that extended the duration of protection for 
already copyrighted works by twenty years). 
5 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 215-16 (“[I]f Congress has the power to extend 
existing terms [of copyright protection], then the Constitution’s requirement that 
terms be ‘limited’ will have no practical effect . . . [and] Congress can achieve what the 
Constitution plainly forbids . . . .”); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 77-78 (2001) 
(describing how copyright principles have been reformulated during the past genera-
tion in “ways that have expanded copyright’s scope and blinded many of us to the dan-
gers that arise from protecting too much, too expansively for too long”). 
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (describing the fair use exceptions to the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders); see also infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the fair use doctrine). 
7 See  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (establishing the idea/ 
expression dichotomy); see also infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the 
idea/expression dichotomy). 
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to keep works of the last eighty years from entering the public do-
main.  But the arts8 have thrived even in the absence of copyright ex-
piration, suggesting that artists have “learned to swim” in a world 
without what has traditionally been thought of as an expanding public 
domain. 
There is an oft-told tale in the literature of arbitration, describing 
two brothers involved in a highly contentious dispute over the owner-
ship of an orange.9  The arbitrator eventually discovers that both sib-
lings can be appeased, as one brother simply wants to squeeze the 
fruit for its juice, while the other seeks only the peel in order to make 
marmalade.  While the Coase Theorem might have suggested that it 
would not matter which brother initially received the orange,10 the 
parable reflects the reality that irrationality will often lead to market 
failure,11 whether the participants are feuding siblings or artists fearful 
that new technology will destroy their livelihood.12  This Comment 
8 It is important to note that the words ‘art’ and ‘science’ have different connota-
tions today than they did when the Framers wrote that Congress would have the power 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
In 1787, the word ‘science’ “referred to knowledge in general, in all fields of knowl-
edge,” whereas “[w]hat we mean today by ‘science’ was then called natural philosophy.  
It was quite clearly intended by the authors of the Constitution that copyright, not pat-
ents, was intended to promote science, and the province of rights granted to inventors 
respecting their ‘Discoveries’ was to promote the ‘useful Arts.’”  Giles Sutherland Rich, 
My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA 1, 2 (1994). 
9 See, e.g., Luis Miguel Diaz, Yes-Talk Rule Prevails over Non-Talk Rule in Mediation, in 
1 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 425, 429 (PLI Litig. & Admin. 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H-704, 2004) (describing a different variation of 
the orange/marmalade story).  For a modern gloss, see CMS, CMS GUIDE TO ADR 10 
(2003) (comparing the orange/marmalade story to a long-running intellectual prop-
erty dispute that was eventually settled through arbitration).
10 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (1960) (suggesting 
that resources will be used by the party who values them more, regardless of any legal 
determination of ownership). 
11 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market:  A Psychoanalysis of Law and Eco-
nomics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 537 (1998) (discussing the role of irrationality in the 
Coase Theorem). 
12 For example, Jack Valenti, the former chief executive of the Motion Picture As-
sociation of America, once claimed that “the VCR is to the American film producer 
and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”  Home 
Recording of Copyrighted Works:  Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, 
H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. 
of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti). 
Despite these initial fears, the home video market has grown to become a vital revenue 
stream for the motion picture industry.  See, e.g., Di Mari Ricker, “Rio” Raises Copyright 
Concerns, ENT. L. & FIN., Dec. 1998, at 1, 1 (noting that the introduction of the VCR 
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proposes a copyright schema intended to reduce irrationality and 
maximize social wealth by strengthening the rights most important to 
traditional content owners, while simultaneously securing the appro-
priation rights most important to consumers and follow-on artists.13  
The ultimate insight of this Comment is that, by making copyright 
protection renewable indefinitely but narrowing the scope of protec-
tion to cover only those works that would act as market substitutes for 
the original work, the realignment of rights and privileges would re-
flect the current trajectory of the law, and moreover would better 
serve the dual interests of copyright owners and content users. 
This Comment has four parts.  Part I traces the evolution of 
American copyright law.  Part II examines the merits of an indefinitely 
renewable copyright regime.  Part III suggests modifications to tradi-
tional copyright doctrines that would complement an indefinitely re-
newable copyright system.  Part IV examines various constitutional 
impediments to creating an indefinitely renewable term of copyright 
protection. 
I.  THE STORY SO FAR:  COPYRIGHT LAW, 1790-TODAY 
The history of American copyright law has generally been one of 
expansion.  Although one might expect a legislative body traditionally 
suspicious of monopolies to continually chip away at the monopolis-
tic14 property rights given to copyright owners, for the most part Con-
gress has tended to broaden the scope and duration of protection af-
forded to authors of creative works. 
This Part traces the chronological development of copyright pro-
tection, with special emphasis placed on the evolution of protectable 
subject matter, infringement by derivative works, and the meaning of 
“limited Times.”  This examination is not simply intended to establish 
“spawned a new industry of videocassette rentals and sales that generated more reve-
nues for Hollywood than the sale of movie tickets”). 
13 Follow-on artists are artists who incorporate pre-existing works into their own 
creations.  See, e.g., Press Release, Negativland, U2 Negativland:  The Case from Our 
Side (Nov. 10, 1991), reprinted in NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE:  THE STORY OF THE LETTER 
U AND THE NUMERAL 2, at 21-25 (1995) (describing Negativland’s creative process as 
follow-on artists). 
14 Intellectual property protection does not provide the holder with a right to use 
the property, but rather with a right to exclude others from using it.  Thus, while copy-
right protection might confer some monopolistic benefits, it is not a monopoly in the 
traditional sense.  For a general discussion of these ideas, see Edmund W. Kitch, Ele-
mentary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 1727 (2000); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84. 
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the current state of the law but rather to demonstrate the trajectory 
along these axes, in order to speculate on their ultimate bounds. 
The first federal copyright statute (one of the earliest pieces of 
legislation enacted by the First Congress in 1790) vested in the author 
of “any map, chart, book or books . . . the sole right and liberty of 
printing, reprinting, publishing and vending [those works] . . . for the 
term of fourteen years from the time of recording the title thereof in 
the clerk’s office . . . .15  This copyright protection could be renewed 
for one additional fourteen-year term if the author was still alive at the 
end of the first term.16
These initial limitations—restricting what constituted copyright-
able subject matter, providing a short duration of protection, and re-
quiring registration—all seem logically grounded in the utilitarian 
philosophy expressed in the Promote Progress Clause17 and yet reflect 
the Framers’ general distaste for granting commercial monopolies.18
In 1831, the subject matter of copyright was expanded to include 
“musical composition[s],” and the grant of protection was increased 
to twenty-eight years (again renewable for an additional fourteen-year 
term).19  However, an author’s rights remained limited to publication 
and copying.20  Courts did not recognize derivative rights21 as a dis-
tinct entity, instead generally construing the scope of protection quite 
narrowly.22  For example, in Stowe v. Thomas, Harriet Beecher Stowe 
unsuccessfully argued that a German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin23 
15 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). 
16 Id. 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
18 See Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copy-
right Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 922-28 (2002) (describing the 
Framers’ concerns regarding intellectual property monopolies).  Indeed, Thomas Jef-
ferson explicitly suggested that the Bill of Rights provide “clearly and without the aid 
of sophisms for . . . [a] restriction against monopolies.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:  THE 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, at 
512 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995). 
19 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870). 
20 Id. § 1. 
21 In other words, courts did not recognize the right to transform copyrighted ma-
terial into a new work, such as making a postcard featuring a painting, a movie based 
on a play, or a sequel to a novel. 
22 See Amy B. Cohen, When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of a Copy-
right Owner?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 623, 626 (1999) (“Even when musical com-
positions were added to the list of protectable works in 1831, the author of such works 
was not given a right to control performances of those works . . . .”). 
23 HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (Univ. of Va. Library) (1852). 
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infringed her copyright in the novel.24  The court, reasoning that 
copyright protection only applied to literal, word-for-word copying, 
rejected Stowe’s infringement claims, holding that “[a] translation 
may, in loose phraseology, be called a transcript or copy of her 
thought or conceptions, but in no correct sense can it be called a copy 
of her book.”25
However, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Congress 
began to grant authors certain limited rights in derivative works.26  In 
1856, copyright holders were given the “sole right to act, perform, or 
represent [their original work of authorship], or cause it be acted, 
performed, or represented, on any stage or public place.”27  This 
“public performance” right was expanded in an 1870 statute that al-
lowed “authors [to] reserve the right to dramatize or translate their 
own works.”28
Complementing this increase in protection afforded to authors 
was a judicial recognition of what has come to be known as the first 
sale doctrine.  According to this principle, an author’s interest in her 
intellectual property is distinct from consumers’ personal property 
rights in legitimately purchased items containing the author’s creative 
expression.29  Following steady approval by the lower federal courts,30 
24 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). 
25 Id. at 208. 
26 See Cohen, supra note 22, at 627 (discussing Congress’s gradual expansion of the 
scope of copyright protection). 
27 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (repealed 1870). 
28 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909).  The reser-
vation requirement was subsequently dropped, and the dramatization right became 
automatic in 1891.  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 1, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107 (repealed 
1909).
29 See Cohen, supra note 22, at 629-31 (discussing the first sale doctrine).  For 
modern glosses on the topic, see Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 
Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146-51 (1998) (applying the first sale doctrine to imported copies of 
protected works); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 
44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 578, 610-15 (2003) (examining the impact of technological change 
on the first sale doctrine). 
30 See, e.g., Kipling v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 120 F. 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1903) (holding 
that the defendants did not commit copyright infringement by selling a set of the 
plaintiff’s works that they purchased from him, even though a previous compilation of 
the plaintiff’s works had already been copyrighted by a different publisher); Doan v. 
Am. Book Co., 105 F. 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1901) (concluding that the appellant did not 
infringe upon the appellee’s copyright because “[t]he sale of [the copyrighted books] 
by the appellee carried with it the ordinary incidents of ownership in personal prop-
erty . . . and the appellants, purchasing them, had the right to resell them”); Harrison 
v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894) (“[T]he right to restrain the 
sale of a particular copy of [a] book . . . has gone when the owner of the copyright and 
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the Supreme Court formally endorsed the first sale doctrine in Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, holding that the sole right to “vend” a work pro-
tected by copyright law extended only to the initial sale of any em-
bodiment of an intellectual property; thus “[t]he purchaser of a book, 
once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, 
although he could not publish a new edition of it.”31
In addition to these rights in tangible property, courts in the mid-
nineteenth century also began to hold that certain types of copying 
and borrowing were not violations of an author’s exclusive rights.  In 
Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story first articulated the principle (later to 
become the fair use doctrine) that “a fair and bona fide abridgment of 
the [copyrighted] work” might not be deemed an impermissible in-
fringement.32  As the name implies, the fair use doctrine is grounded 
in the equitable notion that certain forms of appropriation—for ex-
ample, copying portions of a protected work in order to criticize or 
parody it—are inherently reasonable.  While an author may not like 
having her creative expression lampooned, a parodic work generally 
does not act as a market substitute for the original.33  Some scholars 
have suggested that the fair use doctrine arose to address the sorts of 
uses where an author is most likely to be unwilling to license her work 
 
of that copy has parted with all his title to it, and has conferred an absolute title to the 
copy upon a purchaser . . . .”); Clemens v. Estes, 22 F. 899, 900 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885) 
(holding that the defendants “had a right to buy, or contract to buy, books from agents 
who lawfully obtained them by purchase from the plaintiff or his publishers”); Stowe, 23 
F. Cas. at 206-07 (“When [an author] has sold his book, the only property which he 
reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply the 
copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes of an-
other the ideas intended to be conveyed.”). 
31 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908). 
32 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, Circuit Justice).  De-
spite the fact that Justice Story suggested the possibility of a fair use defense, the de-
fendant in Folsom, who had reprinted letters written by George Washington that were 
first published by the plaintiff, was nevertheless found to have borrowed too much 
from the plaintiff’s work.  Id.  Interestingly, part of Justice Story’s opinion was 
grounded in a labor/misappropriation rationale, noting that if “the labors of the 
original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is 
sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto.”  Id. at 348.  Nevertheless, 
Justice Story’s framework in Folsom formed the basis for subsequent fair use analyses 
and remained to a significant degree unchanged as it was ultimately codified by Con-
gress.  See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1525, 1588 (2004) (describing the development of the fair use doctrine); see also 
infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the codification of fair use).
33 By contrast, bootleg DVDs and CDs are examples of market substitutes that pre-
vent authors from capturing the full market value of their works. 
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for a reasonable fee (such as a criticism and parody).34  Others (in-
cluding, recently, the Supreme Court) have suggested that fair use 
may be required by the First Amendment.35
Whatever the rationale, the judicially created doctrines of first sale 
and fair use stand out against the general trend of affording copyright 
holders increased protection.  Moreover, they share a recognition that 
certain rights ought to vest in persons other than the author of a 
copyrighted work. 
Another notable limitation on authors emerged in the late nine-
teenth century:  the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Selden, held that facts 
and ideas were uncopyrightable.36  The Court established the idea/ 
expression dichotomy, holding that while an author’s original expres-
sion of an idea is protectable, the underlying idea itself is “the com-
mon property of the whole world.”37  Despite a general trend towards 
increasing the types of works that could be protected by copyright,38 
the Court here announced a clear restriction on copyrightable subject 
matter.  This again reflects the notion that certain aspects of intellec-
tual property become part of the public domain immediately, rather 
than at the expiration of a copyright’s term. 
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt called on Congress to 
completely overhaul the copyright system from the ground up, noting 
that the patchwork development of the scheme through statutory 
amendments and judicial decisions had produced a confusing and in-
consistent system that burdened artists without providing any compa-
rable benefit to the public and that failed to address the many techno-
logical advancements that had, by that time, allowed for the  
 
 
34 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982) 
(“Fair use is one label courts use when they approve a user’s departure from the mar-
ket.”). 
35 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that copyright law 
“incorporates . . . speech-protective purposes and safeguards” and “contains built-in 
First Amendment accommodations”); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copy-
right Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-23 (2001) (discussing the 
relationship between fair use and the First Amendment). 
36 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) (holding that “truths of a science” and “methods of 
an art” cannot be protected by copyright). 
37 Id. at 100. 
38 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1884) 
(holding that photographs are entitled to copyright protection). 
 
2006] LIMITED TIMES 713 
 
production of new types of creative works.39  Congress responded by 
passing the Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909 Act).40  With the Act, 
Congress once again expanded the subject matter of copyrightable 
works, this time to include “all the writings of an author.”41  The Act 
also eliminated the requirement that works be registered before re-
ceiving protection.  Following the passage of the Act, all works affixed 
with a copyright notice were protected immediately upon publica-
tion.42  Congress also responded to judicial trends in the field, for-
mally codifying the first sale doctrine.43  And, once again, Congress 
extended the duration of protection, providing for an initial term of 
twenty-eight years followed by a renewal term of an additional twenty-
eight years.44
Several notable expansions in the area of copyrightable subject 
matter followed the passage of the 1909 Act.  In 1912, Congress 
brought motion pictures within the ambit of copyright protection;45 in 
1952, protection was extended to for-profit public performances of 
nondramatic literary works;46 and although during this time Congress 
39 As President Theodore Roosevelt told Congress: 
Our Copyright laws urgently need revision.  They are imperfect in definition, 
confused and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles 
which, under modern reproductive processes, are entitled to protection; they 
impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the 
fair protection of the public; they are difficult for the courts to interpret and 
impossible for the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction to the pub-
lic.  Attempts to improve them by amendment have been frequent, no less 
than twelve acts for the purpose having been passed since the Revised Stat-
utes.  To perfect them by further amendment seems impractical.  A complete 
revision of them is essential. 
Message of President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress (Dec. 1905), reprinted in ALAN 
LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 7 (1985). 
40 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amending and consolidating the ex-
isting legislation on copyright law) (repealed 1976). 
41 Id. § 4. 
42 See id. § 10 (stating that compliance with the provisions of the Act would ensure 
protection). 
43 See id. § 41 (providing that a copyright is “distinct from the property in the ma-
terial object copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the mate-
rial object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the copyright”). 
44 Id. § 23. 
45 See Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488, 488 (amending the copyright 
statute to include protection for “[m]otion-picture photoplays” and “[m]otion pictures 
other than photoplays”) (repealed 1976). 
46 See Act of July 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-575, 66 Stat. 752, 752 (amending the 
copyright statute to grant copyright holders the right to “present the copyrighted work 
in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or other 
nondramatic literary work”) (repealed 1976). 
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declined to conform U.S. copyright law to the 1886 Berne Convention 
(which sought to harmonize international copyright standards),47 it 
did relax the restrictions preventing foreign works from receiving 
domestic copyright protection.48
Yet judges again tempered these expansions with further recogni-
tion that some content was beyond protection.  In 1942, a federal dis-
trict court held that certain aspects of storytelling were scénes à 
faire—features so generic that they were uncopyrightable.49  Modern 
courts commonly define ‘scénes à faire’ as “incidents, characters or 
settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least stan-
dard, in the treatment of a given topic.”50  This doctrine again reflects 
the notion that the most crucial building blocks for future creative 
works fall outside the scope of copyright protection.
The most recent overhaul of United States copyright law occurred 
in 1976, with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 
Act).51  Congress continued its trend of expanding copyright protec-
tion to an ever-broader array of subject matter:  “[c]opyright protec-
tion subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
 
47 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised July 24, 1971)[hereinafter Berne Convention].  
One major obstacle to U.S. adoption was that the Berne Convention required signato-
ries to provide certain ‘moral rights’ to authors, in keeping with the European ap-
proach to intellectual property, though potentially in conflict with the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s explicit utilitarian philosophy.  Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the 
United States Under the Berne Convention:  A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1212-15 (2002). 
48 See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-84, 63 Stat. 153 (relaxing the copy-
right provisions governing foreign works) (repealed 1976); Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 743, 
44 Stat. 818 (allowing copyright protection for some works not manufactured within 
the United States) (repealed 1976). 
49 See Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 1942) 
(“[S]imilarities and incidental details necessary to the environment or setting of an 
action are not the material of which copyrightable originality consists.”).  Although this 
was the first case to use the phrase “scénes à faire,” judges employed similar reasoning 
in cases dating back at least as far as 1913.  See, e.g., Bachman v. Belasco, 224 F. 815, 816 
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) (“It is to be expected that two playwrights working independently from 
a common source may develop similarities in their plots and in their lines . . . .”).
50 Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  For a collection of 
cases using the Alexander v. Haley definition of ‘scénes à faire,’ see Leslie A. Kurtz, Copy-
right:  The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 81 n.8 (1989). 
51 See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
803 (2000)) (revisiting in its entirety the existing law on copyrights). 
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ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”52  And yet this 
was simultaneously tempered with a codification of the 
idea/expression dichotomy, cordoning off from copyright protection 
any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”53  Similarly, Con-
gress formally extended to copyright owners the exclusive right “to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,”54 but 
again tempered this grant with a codification of the fair use doctrine.55  
Thus, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works did not prevent 
the public from using any copyrighted material “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple cop-
ies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”56
The 1976 Act highlights other trends as well.  The duration of 
copyright protection was again extended, replacing the once-
renewable twenty-eight year term with a single term extending for the 
life of the author plus fifty years.57  A sunset provision was added to 
the manufacturing requirement,58 and the publication requirement 
was replaced with the “fixation” requirement (granting protection to 
any work of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion”).59
The subject matter of copyrights was expanded again in 1980 to 
include computer software.60  In 1988, Congress ostensibly brought 
U.S. copyright law into compliance with the Berne Convention, via 
The Berne Convention Implementation Act. 61  In 1990, Congress en-
52 Id. § 102(a). 
53 Id. § 102(b). 
54 Id. § 106(2). 
55 See id. § 107 (providing the concept of fair use as a defense to copyright in-
fringement). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. § 302(a).  Works for hire, as well as anonymous and pseudonymous works, 
were awarded protection for a term of seventy-five years from publication or one-
hundred years from creation, whichever was shorter.  Id. § 302(c). 
58 Id. § 601. 
59 Id. § 102(a). 
60 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028-29. 
61 Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 101).  While the Act removed the formal affixation requirement, it did not 
create any new ‘moral rights’ rights for artists, but rather asserted that existing U.S. law 
already provided sufficient protection to satisfy the Berne requirements.  See Suhl, su-
pra note 47, at 1212-13 (discussing the Berne Convention Implementation Act). 
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acted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA),62 which provided certain 
additional ‘moral rights’ to the creators of “work[s] of visual art.”63  In 
1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
(CTEA),64 which extended the term of copyright protection for an 
additional twenty years,65 as well as the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA),66 which barred the circumvention of any “technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a [copyright-protected] 
work.”67
Also during this time, there were several notable Supreme Court 
cases that clarified the scope of the fair use doctrine.  In Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court expanded the doctrine 
to include the “time-shifting” use of VCRs.68  In Harper & Row Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Court held that fair use did not ex-
tend to the publication of substantial excerpts from a forthcoming 
work.69  And in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court strongly re-
affirmed the principle that fair use covers parody.70
The point of the preceding analysis is not merely to establish the 
current state of copyright law; rather, it is to suggest that copyright 
protection is evolving in a predictable, determinable pattern. 
Copyrightable subject matter has grown from a brief list of qualify-
ing art forms in 1790 (maps, charts, and books) to include both con-
temporary media that were already known at the time of the framing, 
62 Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990). 
63 Id. § 603.  Because of VARA’s narrow definition of “work of visual art,” these 
rights are rarely litigated.  See Suhl, supra note 47, at 1215 (noting that the statute is 
“invoked only in very limited circumstances”). 
64 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
65 Id. § 102.  The Supreme Court held that this did not violate the “limited Times” 
constraint, even as applied to pre-existing works.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 
(2003).  For further discussion of Eldred, see infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
66 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
1201-1205 (2000)).  For contrasting views of the legislation, compare Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation, Unintended Consequences:  Five Years Under the DMCA (2003), 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended_consequences.pdf (criticizing the DMCA 
for its chilling effect on free expression, its jeopardization of fair use rights, its imposi-
tion on competition and innovation, and its overbroad ban on legitimate computer 
activities), with Orin S. Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 
COPY FIGHTS:  THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 163 
(Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (defending the DMCA). 
67 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000). 
68 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). “Time-shifting” refers to recording a program as it is 
broadcast and watching it at a later time. 
69 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985). 
70 510 U.S. 569, 578-85 (1994). 
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as well as later-developed media such as photographs, motion pic-
tures, and computer software; and the current broadly worded statute 
allows protection for any manner of creative expression capable of be-
ing fixed in a tangible medium.  Although several states have ex-
tended copyright protection to unfixed works,71 federal expansion in 
this area seems unlikely.72  However, it seems quite probable that the 
subject-matter limitation will continue evolving to reflect an ever-
broader understanding of what may constitute an original work of au-
thorship.73
The scope of copyright protection awarded to authors has simi-
larly expanded from narrow publication and copying rights to include 
broad coverage of derivative works.  The institutional hurdles re-
quired to secure protection have decreased dramatically.74  And the 
duration of protection has grown from a renewable fourteen-year 
term to the life of the author plus seventy years.75
Although these trends might suggest that the copyright universe is 
expanding indefinitely, the limiting rules—such as the doctrines of 
fair use, scénes à faire, and first sale, as well as the idea/expression di-
chotomy—all suggest a tipping point, after which the public’s interest 
71 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (expanding copyright 
protection to include works that are not fixed in a tangible medium of expression). 
72 Some scholars have suggested that fixation is not merely “a traditional require-
ment for federal statutory copyright protection” but is in fact “a constitutional require-
ment inherent in the Copyright Clause’s use of the word ‘Writings’ to describe the sub-
ject matter that Congress can protect pursuant to the Clause.”  Thomas B. Nachbar, 
Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 285 (2004); see also 
Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause:  Halting the 
Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 
661, 677-92 (2002) (arguing that fixation is a constitutional requirement).  The Elev-
enth Circuit in United States v. Moghadam accepted this premise arguendo but decided 
the case on other grounds.  175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (1999). 
 Although the issue has not been brought squarely before the Supreme Court, in a 
pre-1976 Act case the Court did suggest that a physical embodiment was required.  See 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“[A]lthough the word ‘writings’ 
might be limited to script or printed material, it may be interpreted to include any 
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”).
73 For example, a district court recently held that copyright protection would be 
available to a “sufficiently creative” sequence of yoga asanas.  Open Source Yogan 
Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 WL 756558, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 
2005).
74 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 494-95 
(2004) (discussing the transition from a conditional copyright regime to an uncondi-
tional copyright regime).
75 Compare Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (renewable fourteen-
year terms), with 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (life of the author plus seventy years). 
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becomes supreme.  However, while all of these doctrines serve to limit 
the outer bounds of exclusive rights awarded to authors, none of them 
act to resist the continual lengthening of copyright duration, and thus 
this trend seems likely to continue.  Moreover, the recognition that 
certain aspects of a work should vest in the public domain immedi-
ately upon its creation only reinforces the intuition that those rights 
that do not immediately vest are ones that society can afford to protect 
with copyright indefinitely. 
II.  FOREVER AND A DAY:  INDEFINITELY RENEWABLE COPYRIGHT 
Building on the conclusion in Part I that the duration of copyright 
protection is likely to continue expanding, this Part examines the 
merits of advancing this pattern to its ultimate end and adopting a re-
gime that would permit perpetual copyright protection. 
Scholars have posited numerous justifications for creating prop-
erty rights in intellectual goods.  A Lockean approach suggests that 
authors should be rewarded for the fruits of their labor.76  Hegelian-
Personhood theory argues that individuals achieve self-actualization 
through their creative works and thus should have certain ‘moral 
rights’ in their works even after creation.77  Professor Neil Netanel has 
argued that copyright protection serves a structural function in a de-
mocratic society, ensuring the independence of authors and publish-
ers and thereby establishing an important check on the ability of the 
government to control the content and flow of information.78
76 See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law:  Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 523-24 (1990) (“Since people owned their bodies, Locke reasoned 
that they also owned the labor of their bodies and, by extension, the fruits of that la-
bor.” (footnote omitted)). 
77 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 34 (1996) (noting that 
for Kant and Hegel, “only objects separate from the self are suitable for alienation”); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-72 (1982) (ar-
guing that property affects an individual’s personhood, and therefore rights should be 
maintained over property); see also G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 66 (T.M. 
Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821) (“[T]hose goods, or rather substantive 
characteristics, which constitute my own private personality and the universal essence 
of my self-consciousness are inalienable and my right to them is imprescriptible.  Such 
characteristics are my personality as such, my universal freedom of will, my ethical life, 
my religion.”).  This theory is closely aligned with the European approach of providing 
‘moral rights’ to authors.  Suhl, supra note 47, at 1208-11. 
78 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 352-53 (1996) (“By supporting a market-based sector of authors and publishers, 
copyright achieves considerable independence from government administrators and 
private patrons who would otherwise meddle in expressive content.”). 
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Absent any constitutional limitation, Congress might seek to regu-
late copyright in order to pursue any one of these philosophical ends.  
However, among all the powers granted to Congress in Section 8 of 
Article I, the Intellectual Property Clause is unique in that it provides 
not just a power (in this case, the ability to grant copyrights and pat-
ents) but also a particular philosophical rationale (and thus a possible 
constraint upon Congress’s use of that power):  “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”79  As a result, legislation enacted 
pursuant to the Intellectual Property Clause is generally analyzed 
solely from a consequentialist perspective:  does it provide a sufficient 
incentive for authors to create new works, and does it provide the pub-
lic with appropriate access to those works?80  However, these inquiries 
are often limited by a presupposition that the utilitarian goals ex-
pressed in the Promote Progress Clause can only be achieved through 
a limited term of protection that must inevitably result in all works ul-
timately passing into the public domain. 
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have pro-
posed a countervailing model that would allow copyrighted works to 
remain protected indefinitely.81  Although indefinite protection could 
be realized in numerous forms, their suggested framework would in-
volve the reinstitution of formal requirements for copyright registra-
tion and renewal, with no set limit on the number of times an author 
and her heirs or assignees could renew the copyright in the work.82  
This Part argues that the adoption of an indefinitely renewable copy-
right scheme would present numerous advantages over the current 
framework, and moreover is preferable to the current practice of ex-
tending the copyright term every time the oldest protected works are 
about to expire. 
Unlike the other changes to copyright law proposed in this Com-
ment, the reintroduction of formal requirements would represent a 
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
80 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 282 (1970) (discussing these 
ends as the twin goals of copyright law); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, 
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 
123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in con-
ferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors 
of authors.”). 
81 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 471, 473 (2003). 
82 Id. 
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clear shift in the opposite direction of copyright law’s current trajec-
tory.83  However, these requirements would serve several important 
functions and would mitigate or eliminate many of the prime con-
cerns generally raised in opposition to extended or perpetual terms of 
copyright protection. 
First, the reintroduction of registration and renewal would reduce 
the tracing costs inherent in identifying the owner (or owners) of a 
copyright in a given work.84  This is not generally a problem associated 
with recently published commercial works (as most content owners 
and distributors include copyright notices even though such affixation 
is no longer required for copyright protection);85 however, tracing 
costs are often cited as a reason not to extend the term of copyright 
protection,86 based on the rationale that a longer term increases the 
possibility that a copyrighted work will be “orphaned.”87  While this 
may be true in the case of automatic extensions,88 requiring reasona-
bly frequent renewal (for example, every ten or twenty years) would 
83 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting that copyright law has evolved 
in the direction of reducing and eliminating formalities). 
84 Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 477-78; see also LESSIG, supra note 2, at 288 
(“Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with whom one must deal 
in order to use or build upon the creative work of others. . . . [T]hus, the lack of for-
malities forces many into silence where they otherwise could speak.”). 
85 See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 
2853 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-406 (2000)) (modifying the 
copyright scheme to make the affixation of copyright notice permissive rather than 
required). 
86 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 26 
(1997) (testimony of Larry Urbanski, Chairman, American Film Heritage Association) 
[hereinafter Urbanski Senate Testimony] (arguing that an increased term of protection 
will increase the difficulty in preserving old films due to increased tracing costs). 
87 “Orphan works” are generally defined as “copyrighted works where the rights 
holder is hard to find.”  Save Orphan Works, http://eldred.cc (last visited Jan. 20, 
2006). These works present a problem for follow-on artists who wish to use them, since 
the search costs associated with identifying copyright owners make the endeavor pro-
hibitively expensive, “even when [the artist would] be willing to pay [a reasonable li-
cense fee] to use them.  In many cases the works were abandoned because they no 
longer produced any income. In most cases, rights holders, once found, are delighted 
to have their work used.”  Id. 
 One area where the problem has been particularly pronounced is film preserva-
tion, as many early films were produced by studios that are now defunct.  See Urbanski 
Senate Testimony, supra note 86, at 26. 
 The Copyright Office recently requested public comments for a study of orphan 
works.  Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005). 
88 E.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998) (automatically extending the term of copyright protection by twenty 
years). 
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actually reduce the tracing costs associated with the current life-plus-
seventy years term of protection.89
Similarly, a transition from the current system to one that requires 
renewal at regular intervals would likely lead to a large number of 
works actually entering the public domain sooner.90  While critics of 
copyright extension often complain that it ‘starves’ the public domain 
by prolonging the time before works become free for public use,91 
given the sheer volume of material that potentially qualifies for copy-
right protection today (from e-mails to doodles to outgoing answering 
machine messages92), it seems implausible that any more than a small 
fraction of these works would be renewed even once.93
This intuition is further supported by empirical data examining 
works created and published prior to the 1976 Act.  Of the works reg-
istered for copyright protection between 1883 and 1964, only ten per-
cent were renewed at the end of their initial twenty-eight-year term of 
protection.94  Although the cost of renewal may have been a signifi-
cant deterrent for authors of composite works (such as a large series 
of individually copyrighted photographs), in the vast majority of cases 
it appears that the abandonment of copyright protection was due to 
the “sheer bother of applying for renewal” rather than the renewal fee 
(which grew from fifty cents in 1909 to the still modest $60 in 2002).95
And yet, while the bulk of copyrighted works would eventually en-
ter into the public domain, it remains a near certainty that the most 
popular and valuable works would be renewed so long as they re-
mained commercially viable.96  Thus, it is important to focus on the 
effect of allowing this select subset of works to remain in private con-
trol indefinitely.  For these works, there are the basic concerns that, as 
they grow more valuable over time, there would be increasing costs to 
the public, in both the licensing fees that the copyright holder could 
89 Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 477-78. 
90 Id. at 517-18. 
91 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 24-25. 
92 These all could qualify for copyright protection as “original works . . . fixed in 
[a] tangible medium of expression.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
93 See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 474 (arguing, based on empirical data, 
that even under a regime in which copyrights could be renewed indefinitely, “few 
would be renewed if even a slight fee were required,” and only “the most valuable 
works would probably be renewed many times”). 
94 Id. at 496-500. 
95 Id. at 474 & n.10. 
96 See id. at 473-74 (discussing data on the number of copyrights that have been 
renewed). 
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charge as well as the deadweight loss attributable to individuals being 
unwilling or unable to pay the increased fees.97  Yet these problems 
will persist in the current system as well, so long as Congress continues 
in its trend of retroactively extending copyright protection. 
Moreover, it is important to consider whether there may be a net 
gain from allowing these works to be renewed indefinitely.  Certainly, 
from a Lockean perspective, such a change would represent an im-
provement;98 but might there be a utilitarian gain as well? 
The notion that copyright protection ought to have an expiration 
date is grounded in traditional monopoly concerns,99 leading many 
scholars to assume that economic efficiency requires all copyrights to 
be limited in duration.100  While this assumption is at odds with tradi-
tional economic notions that valuable resources should be owned in 
order to ensure “efficient exploitation and to avoid overuse,”101 it is 
not self-evident that these monopoly concerns apply with equal force 
to intangible “intellectual” goods. 
Indeed, at first blush, intellectual property might seem to be im-
mune to such concerns:  the non-rival, non-extinguishable nature of 
creative expression would seem to suggest that once in the public do-
main, a work could be exploited by any member of society in whatever 
way she believed would maximize her own private value, without any 
negative externalities.102
97 Id. at 479-81. 
98 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the Labor Theory of intel-
lectual property ownership). 
99 See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 18, at 922-28 (discussing debates over the ratifica-
tion of the copyright provision of the Constitution and ensuing concerns about mo-
nopolies). 
100 See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 471 (noting that this is a “widely ac-
cepted proposition”); see also Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners at 10-12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 
1041846 (arguing that copyright term extension increases the social cost of monop-
oly); Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age:  Slowing the Convergence at 
the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 598 (1999) (“The trend to-
ward greater information ownership and longer copyright terms will drive up the social 
costs of new work and drive down the opportunity for works built on a shared public 
experience.”). 
101 Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 475.  See generally Garrett Hardin, The Trag-
edy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (“Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons.”). 
102 See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Pro-
fessors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, “The Copyright Term Extension Act” 
9 (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/ 
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Yet content owners have long recognized that over-exposure re-
duces the total value of a creative work, and indeed, many copyright 
holders seeking to maximize their profits do so by carefully restricting 
their exploitation so as not to saturate and ultimately squander the 
market for their work.103  Similarly, research in behavioral economics 
suggests that an over-abundance of choices reduces consumer infor-
mation, making consumers more likely to choose nothing rather than 
anything.104
The point here is not to suggest that there is no value to be had 
from works in the public domain, but rather that the utilitarian gains 
from extended copyright protection could easily outweigh the losses.  
Given the appropriation rights that are immediately available through 
doctrines such as fair use, the remaining uses of copyrighted works 
that are withheld from the public are those uses that the public can 
most easily do without. 
Although scholars tend to blanche at the possibility of a world in 
which Sir Laurence Olivier could not play Hamlet,105 such hyperbolic 
fears are almost certainly overstated.  For example, it seems likely that 
in a world with indefinitely renewable copyright protection, the mar-
ket for copyright assignments would continue to grow, presumably 
along the lines of what has already developed in the areas of musical 
compositions and theatrical works, where large publishing houses 
such as Samuel French specialize in acquiring and licensing protected 
works.106  Indeed, organizations generally thought of as resource-
OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1998statement.html (“There can be no over-
grazing of intellectual property . . . because intellectual property is not destroyed or 
even diminished by consumption.  Once a work is created, its intellectual content is 
infinitely multipliable.”). 
103 See, e.g., Bill Britt, Disney’s Global Goals, MARKETING, May 17, 1990, at 22 (discuss-
ing Disney’s efforts to extend the commercial life of its protected properties); see also 
Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 486-88 (demonstrating that congestion or overuse 
externalities could decrease the total value of an intellectual property). 
104 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-79 (1998) (discussing 
“bounded rationality”). 
105 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 29 (suggesting society is better off with the 
works of Shakespeare in the public domain). 
106 See generally Samuel French, Inc., Royalties and Rights Information (2004), 
http://www.samuelfrench.com/store (follow “Royalty Information” hyperlink) (de-
scribing performance restrictions and royalty policies for Samuel French plays and mu-
sicals).  Organizations such as the Copyright Clearance Center have made similar in-
roads in the information content industry.  See, e.g., Copyright Clearance Center, 
Corporate Overview:  Copyright Clearance Solutions (2006), http://www.copyright.com/ 
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poor—such as schools and community theaters—are already able to 
license some protected works because the publishing houses, seeking 
to capture these smaller markets, employ a licensing structure that al-
lows for price discrimination (based on factors such as theater size 
and ticket price), making it commercially viable for all involved.107
But since it is reasonable to assume that there will be market fail-
ures, it is important to consider what will be lost in the cases of works 
that never enter the public domain and cannot be freely licensed.  
The public is free to take any underlying ideas from those works (due 
to the idea/expression dichotomy), as well as to copy as much as is 
necessary for fair use purposes such as criticism and parody.  Thus, 
the public will lose only those appropriations that fail to meet the 
thresholds of fair use. 
This leads to two logical points:  first, the standard for fair use 
should be clearly defined so as to prevent copyright holders from 
chilling acceptable expression;108 and second, the definition should be 
broad enough to cover the class of expressions vital to society that 
would otherwise be suppressed.  While this Comment argues that the 
contours of fair use should be adapted to better fit a regime of indefi-
nitely renewable copyright, even under the current framework, if 
something fails to meet the minimum standards to qualify for fair use, 
it should be something that society can do without. 
Scholars tend to reject this latter suggestion out of hand, citing 
(depending on the level of cultural literacy they wish to intimate) ei-
ther West Side Story109 as an adaptation of William Shakespeare’s Romeo 
and Juliet,110 or Clueless111 as an adaptation of Jane Austen’s Emma112 as 
ccc/do/viewPage?pageCode=au1 (describing the company’s role as an “intermediary 
between copyright owners and content users”). 
107 This is not to say that there are not sometimes troubling conflicts within the 
system.  There is certainly a prevalent perception that the “best” copyrighted works 
remain too expensive for resource-poor organizations to license.  And reduced-fee li-
censees are often forced to accept strict restrictions.  For an example from across the 
pond that could plausibly happen stateside, see Tom Morgan, Why Grease Is Not the 
Word, DAILY EXPRESS (U.K.), Nov. 30, 2004, at 26 (describing a school production of 
Grease that was not allowed to advertise for fear of competing with a professional tour-
ing version). 
108 This first point does not seem controversial, though it seems likely to play an 
important role in establishing a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright.  See infra 
notes 151-53 and accompanying text (arguing that clarification of the fair use Doctrine 
would address the primary concern regarding indefinitely renewable copyright). 
109 LEONARD BERNSTEIN, WEST SIDE STORY (1957). 
110 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MOST EXCELLENT AND LAMENTABLE TRAGEDY OF 
ROMEO AND JULIET.  For a description of West Side Story as “a modern update” of Romeo 
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examples of works that would be lost under an indefinitely renewable 
paradigm.  Bracketing for a moment the question of whether or not 
those expressions should qualify as derivative works infringing the 
original copyright,113 the larger point is that, to the extent copyright 
protection forces artists to be more creative in order to avoid in-
fringement, the public has benefited.  This depends in large part on 
the idea/expression dichotomy; while the actual expression—
“Wherefore art thou Romeo?”114—is protected, the underlying idea—
star-crossed lovers, things end badly—is immediately vested in the 
public domain and free for appropriation.  Thus, if Shakespeare’s 
works were still under copyright protection, follow-on artists would be 
free to rely on Shakespeare’s words and structure as inspiration, yet 
they would be forced to add enough unique material or otherwise 
substantially modify any portions they borrowed115 in order to create a 
non-infringing work, with the marketplace rewarding the most suc-
cessful innovations. 
However, even assuming that the public can appropriately exploit 
the most valuable copyrighted works (through fair use and the 
idea/expression dichotomy), there remains the second half of the 
question:  would an indefinitely renewable copyright regime produce 
a net benefit over the current system?  There is, of course, a natural 
inclination to be skeptical of a framework that would appear to repre-
sent a windfall to the holders of those copyrights with lasting value; 
does the public receive any comparable benefit from the Walt Disney 
and Juliet, see Broadway:  The American Musical, Memorable Musicals, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/broadway/musicals/westside.html. 
111 CLUELESS (Paramount Pictures 1995). 
112 JANE AUSTEN, EMMA (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1933) (1816).  
For a discussion of the influence of Emma on the director of Clueless, see Interview by 
the American Film Institute with Amy Heckerling, Director of Clueless, in Los Angeles, 
Cal. (Sept. 14, 1995), http://www.jasa.net.au/study/ahinterview.htm. 
113 See infra note 146 and accompanying text (suggesting that under a narrow defi-
nition of derivative work, West Side Story and Clueless would not be considered infringe-
ments). 
114 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 110, act 2, sc. 2. 
115 To the extent that certain dramatic schemata are required in order to tell a 
story, the scénes à faire doctrine holds that such takings do not constitute infringe-
ment.  See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 
1980) (finding that representations of the Hindenburg disaster did not constitute in-
fringement, as similarities in portrayal were determined by the subject matter); see also 
supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing the scénes à faire doctrine).
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Corporation’s continued ownership of rudimentary cartoons Walt 
Disney made almost eighty years ago?116
The answer may be yes.  Beyond simply fostering a higher thresh-
old of creativity for follow-on artists, indefinitely renewable protection 
encourages copyright owners to promote, enhance, restore, and oth-
erwise commercially exploit their protected works.  For example, the 
film It’s a Wonderful Life117 fell into the public domain after the expira-
tion of its initial term of protection because “the copyright holder 
failed to file a timely renewal application.”118  As a result, there was no 
quality control over the work:  television stations severely edited the 
film to make room for more commercials, and the broadcast picture 
quality was poor because no one was willing to invest in restoring the 
prints.119  Moreover, consumers who purchased home video cassettes 
of the film often unwittingly received low-quality bootlegs.120
However, the copyright holders were able to reclaim the film from 
the public domain by asserting their rights to the underlying short 
story and music.121  Subsequently, the copyright holders invested sig-
nificant capital in producing a high-quality restoration of the film; this 
was possible because the investment costs could be recouped through 
the sale of exclusive distribution rights.122  Thus, in at least some cir-
cumstances, the public as a whole would seem to derive certain bene-
fits from the extension of private copyright ownership. 
As a corollary to these issues related to indefinitely renewable 
copyright, Congress would likely be able to generate a significant 
amount of revenue by switching from the current system to one in 
which copyright owners must pay a set fee for each renewal of their 
copyright.  Indeed, since there is generally a polarization in the value 
of protected material over time (with most works tending towards ei-
116 E.g., PLANE CRAZY (Walt Disney Pictures 1928) (featuring the first appearance 
of Mickey Mouse); STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney Pictures 1928) (featuring the first 
appearance of Mickey Mouse with synchronized sound).  While Walt Disney provided 
Mickey Mouse’s voice and personality, the character was actually designed and ani-
mated by Ub Iwerks.  LESLIE IWERKS & JOHN KENWORTHY, THE HAND BEHIND THE 
MOUSE 53-56 (2001). 
117 IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films Inc. 1946). 
118 Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain:  Exploring the Myths Behind 
Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 273 (2002).
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 273-74. 
121 Id. at 273. 
122 Id. at 274. 
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ther extremely high or extremely low value123), Congress would be 
able to charge substantial fees for subsequent renewals without signifi-
cantly altering the incentive structure created by an indefinitely re-
newable copyright regime.124
What, then, to do with all of this money?  Separate from the issues 
previously discussed, creating an increasingly prominent role for li-
braries could be an important policy lever in an indefinitely renewable 
framework.125  There are, under the current system, already incentives 
for copyright owners to register their works and deposit copies with 
the Register of Copyrights and the Library of Congress.126  But there 
are no comparable measures currently contained within the legal in-
frastructure that facilitate the distribution of copyright-protected 
works to public libraries.  By redirecting money from renewal fees into 
the public library system (and fostering a broader, more efficient in-
ter-library loan system), this new framework could ensure that all 
123 See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 474 (noting that most copyrights rapidly 
depreciate in value). 
124 While determining the proper amount of the fees is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of administering an indefinitely 
renewable copyright system could be supported by renewal fees.  The rent-seeking be-
havior of copyright owners whose copyrights were about to expire before the passage 
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act suggests that, rather than lobby 
Congress for another extension every twenty years, they could just as easily spend that 
money paying renewal fees.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 483 (discussing 
rent-seeking behavior).  Moreover, given that some intellectual properties are valued at 
over a billion dollars, it seems plausible that Congress could set ever-increasing renewal 
fees that ultimately reached into the millions.  See, e.g., DAN RAVIV, COMIC WARS:  
MARVEL’S BATTLE FOR SURVIVAL 176-77 (2002) (recounting an industry insider’s esti-
mation that the intellectual property rights to the character Spider-Man were worth 
one billion dollars); David Rowan, A Small Bear with a Very Big Legal Bill, TIMES (U.K.), 
Nov. 22, 2003, at 40, available at 2003 WLNR 4977416 (noting that the intellectual 
property rights to the character Winnie the Pooh are estimated to be between one and 
five billion dollars).  
125 For a discussion on alternative ways libraries could be used to preserve culture, 
see Alicia Ryan, Note, Contract, Copyright, and the Future of Digital Preservation, 10 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 152, 160-65 (2004).  There are, of course, various First Amendment 
concerns that would follow from any reliance on the library system to disseminate all 
works to all patrons.  See, e.g., David Norden, Note, Filtering out Protection:  The Law, the 
Library, and Our Legacies, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 767 (2003) (examining First Amend-
ment issues surrounding the use of internet filtering software in public libraries to fil-
ter out pornography).
126 17 U.S.C. §§ 407, 408 (2000).  Although the statute incentivizes both registra-
tion and deposit, in order to remain in compliance with the Berne Convention, nei-
ther is a requirement for acquiring copyright protection.  See Berne Convention, supra 
note 47, art. III (setting requirements for contracting states that require registration 
under their domestic law). 
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copyrighted works are made available to the public for free immedi-
ately upon publication and registration.  Indeed, while works in the 
public domain are theoretically possessed by the public at large, there is 
no guarantee that members of the public will actually have access to 
them.  Just as the underlying idea of a copyrighted work vests with the 
public immediately, so too should the ability to access the copyrighted 
work vest immediately as well. 
Ultimately, an indefinitely renewable term of copyright protection 
presents numerous advantages over the current system.  While it is not 
clear whether the benefits of switching to such a scheme would ulti-
mately outweigh the costs if the extant framework were to remain 
static, it seems likely that the current system will continue evolving in 
the same direction of ever-increasing terms of protection without any 
of the comparable benefits that would be derived from registration 
and renewal.  An indefinitely renewable framework is preferable to 
this practice, in that it would better promote the utilitarian goals of 
copyright law. 
III.  GIVE AND TAKE:  FAIR USE AND DERIVATIVE WORKS 
Although copyright law has grown and evolved in numerous ways 
that have expanded the rights and benefits available to copyright 
holders (such as lengthening the term of protection127 and broaden-
ing the scope of protectable subject matter128), the legal precepts that 
have provided rights and benefits to the public (such as the fair use 
doctrine) have remained relatively unchanged since their inception.129  
This Part argues that, in conjunction with the transition to a regime of 
indefinitely renewable copyright, complementary modifications to the 
scope of traditional copyright protection should also be instituted so 
as to balance more evenly the needs of copyright holders with those of 
content users. 
127 Compare Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (providing a fourteen-year 
term of copyright protection, renewable for one additional fourteen-year term) (re-
pealed 1831), with Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (providing copyright protection for the life of the author plus 
seventy years). 
128 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 27, 35 Stat. 1175 (providing copyright 
protection for motion pictures) (repealed 1976); Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
517, 94 Stat. 3015 (providing copyright protection for computer software). 
129 The fair use doctrine codified in the 1976 Act is substantially similar to Justice 
Story’s formulation in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).  
See Madison, supra note 32, at 1588 (“Folsom gave us the syntax of fair use.”). 
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As previously discussed,130 the derivative works and fair use doc-
trines evolved to determine which manner of non-identical copying 
fell within the exclusive rights afforded to authors and which were 
immediately permissible by the public.  While recognition of deriva-
tive works protection addresses the problem of free riders who seek 
merely to capitalize on the creative output of an artist,131 the fair use 
doctrine seeks to carve out an exception for original works that draw 
in part on protected expressions. 
The four factors that Congress instructed courts to consider in de-
termining whether a use should be deemed ‘fair’ are 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.
132
Congress apparently intended to create a fluid standard that 
could be adapted to changing times.133  As a result, numerous courts134 
and academics135 have struggled with the four factors’ intrinsic ambi-
 
130 See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text (tracing the development of what 
courts considered to be copyright infringement). 
131 Such free rider exploitation would prevent authors from capturing the full 
value of their works, thus reducing authors’ incentives to create works in the first place 
and possibly driving them out of the market. 
132 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  Although congressionally mandated, these factors are 
all derived from the judicially created fair use exception.  See Madison, supra note 32, at 
1588 (noting that Justice Story’s Folsom opinion is “chiefly known [for] its formulation 
of what has come down to us as the four statutory fair use factors”). 
133 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5680 (noting that “there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, espe-
cially during a period of rapid technological change,” and further emphasizing that 
“courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case ba-
sis”).  
134 See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-17 (9th Cir. 
2001) (applying the factors from the 1976 Act to the facts of the case against Napster); 
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918-32 (2d Cir. 1994) (analyzing 
the four factors from the 1976 Act in the context of the infringement action against 
Texaco). 
135 See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1659, 1669-86 (1988) (discussing the relative importance of the four factors); 
Gordon, supra note 34, at 1604 (“[T]he ambiguity of the fair use doctrine and its statu-
tory formulation obscure the underlying issues and make consistency and predictabil-
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guity.  The Supreme Court has most notably given guidance by stating 
that the fourth factor is “undoubtedly the single most important ele-
ment of fair use.”136  While some scholars have criticized this emphasis 
on the fourth factor,137 it can nevertheless be viewed as the magnetic 
pole of fair use analysis, and one might speculate that, as copyright 
protection evolves, the significance of the fourth factor will continue 
to grow to the point that perhaps the other factors become irrele-
vant.138  Complementing the argument in Part II that the copyright 
extension trend should be hastened into an indefinitely renewable 
copyright regime, this Part argues that such a scheme would best be 
served by taking the fair use trend towards emphasizing the fourth fac-
tor to its ultimate conclusion as well.   
A chief concern with an indefinitely renewable framework is that 
certain types of expressions could be perpetually barred as infringing 
the copyright of protected works.  A fair use test based solely on the 
fourth factor would ensure that the only expressions being suppressed 
were those that would act as a substitute for works already present in 
 
ity difficult to achieve.”); Madison, supra note 32, at 1550-64 (describing the interpre-
tive difficulties posed by the statutory codification of the four factors). 
136 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).  But 
see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more trans-
formative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commer-
cialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”).  The Court in Campbell also 
noted that “the four statutory factors [may not] be treated in isolation, one from an-
other.  All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the pur-
poses of copyright.”  Id. at 578 (citations omitted).  While some lower courts have 
found significance in the Court’s failure to reiterate the importance of the fourth fac-
tor, see, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 926 (“Apparently abandoning the idea 
that any factor enjoys primacy, Campbell instructs that ‘[a]ll [four factors] are to be ex-
plored, and the results weighed together . . . .’” (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578)), 
others have continued to give that factor preeminence, see, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press 
v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996) (“In determining 
whether a use is ‘fair,’ the Supreme Court has said that the most important factor is 
the fourth . . . .”).
137 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1077 (1997) (“The problem has been the tendency of the courts 
to focus primarily on market harm to the copyright owner, to the exclusion of all 
else.”).
138 At least one scholar has suggested that the fourth factor alone is already deter-
minative in fair use analysis.  See 1 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, § 1.10[D], at 1-152 (1984) (“Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to 
copying by others that does not materially impair the marketability of the work that is 
copied.” (footnote omitted)).
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the marketplace.139  In practice, this should result in a broader fair use 
doctrine, protecting a wider array of works while excluding only those 
that lack sufficient creativity to target a separate and distinct market. 
However, this point highlights one of the problems inherent in a 
fourth factor analysis:  determining the relevant market for the fair 
use analysis.  A German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin might have 
very little impact on the market for the English version.140  On the 
other hand, an audio recording of a novel might easily supplant the 
market demand for the paperback equivalent, yet there might simul-
taneously be a distinct demand for the audio recording itself.141  This 
problem exists due to the broad protection currently given to deriva-
tive works.  Thus, the proposed modification to the fair use doctrine 
would best be achieved by simultaneously narrowing the scope of de-
rivative works protection as well. 
The simplest solution would be to stop extending copyright pro-
tection to derivative works entirely.  Naomi Voegtli has suggested that 
such rights are not necessary for an author to profit from ancillary 
markets for her work.142  She argues that lead time (and thus the op-
portunity to create derivative works prior to publication), as well the 
ability to profit from goodwill associated with claims of authenticity 
(which non-authors would be barred from doing under laws of unfair 
competition), may provide sufficient compensation.143  However, this 
places a heavier burden on the author while primarily benefiting free 
riders, an odd direction in which to move the law.144  Ms. Voegtli of-
 
139  Moreover, these works would ideally be available via public libraries.  See supra 
notes 125-26 and accompanying text (suggesting that copyright renewal fees be used to 
support the public library system). 
140 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing a court opinion reject-
ing an infringement claim based on a German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin). 
141 For example, it seems likely that Michael Imperioli, a star of HBO’s mafia-
themed drama The Sopranos, was enlisted to record the audio version of Mario Puzo’s 
mafia-themed novel Omerta at least partly in order to capitalize on a segment of the 
market that would not otherwise purchase the book.  Mike Flaherty, Bold Soprano, ENT. 
WKLY., June 16, 2000, at 87. 
142 Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1242-
43 (1997). 
143 Id. at 1242. 
144 While the benefit to free riders could conceivably trickle down to the public, as 
the commercialization of market substitutes would be likely to drive down prices and 
reduce deadweight loss, that benefit would be offset by the decreased incentive to cre-
ate new works, and moreover, a comparable benefit (without the corresponding loss) 
could be achieved by making the actual works available for free through public librar-
ies.  See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing the role that public li-
braries could play in an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme). 
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fers a better solution to the line-drawing problem with her suggested 
redefinition of derivative work: 
A “derivative work” is either (1) a work based significantly upon one or 
more pre-existing works, such that it exhibits little originality of its own 
or that it unduly diminishes economic prospects of the works used; or 
(2) a translation, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, and 
condensation.
145
This would scale nicely with the modified fair use analysis, provid-
ing protection to authors against derivative works that would act as a 
market substitute for the author’s original expression, while still allow-
ing follow-on artists to create new works inspired by existing art, so 
long as they were infused with sufficient originality.  Under such a 
framework, West Side Story and Clueless would seem to be safe from 
claims of infringement.146
However, there would still be the question of how much a work’s 
economic prospects would need to be diminished for it to rise to the 
level of being ‘undue.’  For example, even if one assumed that Bridget 
Jones’s Diary147 contained the necessary level of creativity to distinguish 
it from Pride and Prejudice148 as a literary work, both novels have re-
cently been adapted to films that were targeted at overlapping demo-
graphic groups.149  Thus, one might be tempted to argue for the seem-
ingly perverse conclusion that the two films unduly compete for the 
same market in a way that the novels do not.  Yet so long as the ques-
tion of whether a ‘borrowing’ work infringes the original is answered 
solely by focusing on the fourth factor of the fair use analysis, any 
seemingly illogical results thereby produced would merely be reflec-
tions of the differences in the market for each medium of expres-
sion.150
145 Voegtli, supra note 142, at 1267. 
146 See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (discussing works such as West 
Side Story and Clueless, which are adaptations of earlier pieces). 
147 HELEN FIELDING, BRIDGET JONES’S DIARY (1998). 
148 JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
1960) (1813). 
149 Compare BRIDGET JONES’S DIARY (Little Bird Ltd. 2001), with PRIDE AND 
PREJUDICE (Working Title Films 2005). 
150 The Supreme Court made roughly the same point in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu-
sic, Inc., noting that while 2 Live Crew’s rap parody “Oh, Pretty Woman” did not in-
fringe Roy Orbison’s non-rap non-parody “Oh, Pretty Woman,” it might nevertheless 
have harmed the market for a theoretical rap non-parody version of the song, and thus 
might still infringe Orbison’s exclusive right to derivative versions of the work.  510 
U.S. 569, 577-79 (1994). 
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Moreover, so long as courts are vigilant in protecting the original 
work from market substitutes, this narrower conception of derivative 
works should not significantly diminish the incentive structure of 
copyright protection, even though it simultaneously provides the pub-
lic with a wider array of creative expressions. 
Finally, an ancillary concern with indefinitely renewable copyright 
protection is that it would heighten current problems that exist due to 
the ambiguity surrounding the contours of fair use.  Professor Polk 
Wagner has convincingly argued that both copyright owners and ap-
propriators are made worse off by the uncertainty of the doctrine.151  
In addition, as new technologies develop and new uses for creative 
works arise, these uncertainties are magnified, and all parties experi-
ence a loss in perceived rights.152  However, this problem too could be 
solved by shifting to a fair use test that relies solely on the fourth fac-
tor; such a test would increase clarity and certainty, and thus the value 
of the works to all parties.153
Ultimately, an indefinitely renewable copyright regime should be 
paired with a modified conception of the proper scope of copyright 
protection.  An emphasis on the fourth fair use factor would 
strengthen the economic incentive to create new works by providing 
stronger financial protection for those works, while simultaneously 
expanding the public domain by permitting any and all creative ap-
propriations of those works that do not act as market substitutes.  By 
pairing duration extension with a new derivative works/fair use para-
digm, both copyright owners and follow-on artists would be able to ex-
tract valuable elements from the intellectual property without depriv-
ing the other of significant benefits. 
IV.  CAN’T BUY ME LOVE: 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNLIMITED TIMES 
The Intellectual Property Clause provides that Congress may grant 
exclusive rights to authors for “limited Times.”154  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
the Supreme Court held that a single extension of retroactive copy-
right protection was not an attempt by Congress to “evade the ‘limited 
151 See R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm:  Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 427 (2005) (arguing that the uncertainty surrounding the scope 
of copyright law has grown in recent years, potentially resulting in an erosion of fair 
use principles and the concomitant social benefits, creating a “perfect storm”). 
152 Id. at 429. 
153 Id. at 434. 
154 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Times’ constraint by creating effectively perpetual copyrights through 
repeated extensions,”155 but explicitly declined to address what might 
constitute the “outer boundary of ‘limited Times.’”156  This Part specu-
lates on the greatest extent of protection that might be permissible 
under the Intellectual Property Clause, as well as the possibility of cir-
cumventing its limitations through the Commerce Clause. 
There is some historical evidence to suggest that the Limited 
Times Clause was not meant to be a restraint on Congress’s power at 
all.  By some accounts, the Clause was actually included simply to en-
sure that anyone interpreting the Constitution (especially those aware 
of the Framers’ general aversion to monopolies) would understand 
that the power to grant patent and copyright monopolies was meant 
to be included within the subset of acts within Congress’s power un-
der the Intellectual Property Clause.157  Nevertheless, such a reading 
seems unlikely to carry the day, as it is clearly contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s recent classification of the Clause as a constraint on Con-
gress.158  Thus, the question should not be whether the Clause re-
strains Congress’s power, but rather, how? 
In its most literal sense, the “limited Times” restriction would be 
honored so long as copyright protection were granted for fixed terms 
of years.159  Indeed, the original draft of the Intellectual Property 
Clause allowed Congress to grant protection for “a limited time”;160 by 
amending the clause to instead read “limited Times,” the Framers 
presumably intended to allow Congress to grant renewal terms.161  
And in fact, renewal terms were an integral part of the copyright 
155 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003). 
156 Id. at 210 n.17 (2003); cf. 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (state-
ment of Rep. Mary Bono) (“Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last for-
ever.  I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. . . . As 
you know, there is also Jack Valenti’s proposal for term to last forever less one day.  
Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress.”).
157 See Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the Intellec-
tual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 96 (1999) (arguing that “the additional 
language is there because without it the delegates did not believe Congress would have 
authority to grant patents and copyrights, regardless of how broad the authority ‘to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts’ might on its face appear”). 
158 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208. 
159 Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 472. 
160 See George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6, 
14 (1936) (“The original manuscript of [a] draft of the Constitution . . . discloses that 
the original draft included the words ‘for a limited time.’”). 
161 See id. (“There is no record as to why [the change in the ‘limited Times’ lan-
guage] was made but we might guess that it was done for the purpose of permitting a 
patent to be extended.”). 
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scheme from 1790 to 1976.  Thus, even a system of indefinitely renew-
able copyright might be permissible under the Intellectual Property 
Clause.162  Nevertheless, this reading runs up against the problem that 
the Framers seem to have clearly imagined that works protected by 
this Clause would eventually fall into the public domain.163
What, then, of extending copyright protection through another 
grant of power, such as the Commerce Clause?164  The Supreme Court 
has generally been skeptical of congressional attempts to do with one 
power that which it has been explicitly barred from doing with an-
other.165  Thus, the Court has read limitations into the Commerce 
Clause from the Bankruptcy Clause,166 the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause,167 the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury,168 and 
162 See Landes & Posner, supra note 81, at 472 (postulating that the constitutional 
limitation may be circumvented by allowing repeated extensions of the copyright 
term).  But see Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability?  The Intersection of the Intel-
lectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution:  Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare 
Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 286 (1995) (arguing that such a read-
ing is “conceivable, but strained”). 
163 See Nachbar, supra note 72, at 330 n.251 (collecting sources).
164 The Supreme Court has clearly established that Congress may use the Com-
merce Clause to protect certain forms of intellectual property that may not be pro-
tected by the Intellectual Property Clause, such as trademarks.  See The Trade-Mark 
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879) (striking down a federal trademark statute as unconstitu-
tional, but suggesting the possibility that a narrowly tailored statute limited to marks 
used in interstate commerce would be acceptable); see also Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1051 (2000) (limiting trademark protection to marks used in commerce); 
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]rademarks have been covered by a comprehensive federal statutory scheme since 
the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946”).  Moreover, intellectual property protection 
granted under the Commerce Clause could theoretically be infinite in duration.  See 
Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.24 (2005) (“Trademarks are 
capable of infinite term since they may be repeatedly renewed.”). 
165 See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“Congress may not . . . transcend specific limitations on its exercise of the commerce 
power that are imposed by other provisions of the Constitution.”); see generally Pollack, 
supra note 162, at 270-74 (arguing that Congress does not have the power to bypass the 
Intellectual Property Clause through the Commerce Clause).
166 See, e.g., Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982) 
(holding that Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to pass a non-uniform 
bankruptcy law because the Bankruptcy Clause requires bankruptcy laws to be uni-
form). 
167 See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 29-53 (1969) (holding that a provi-
sion of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment).
168 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (“Whatever might be 
said of Congress’ objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the 
exercise of basic constitutional rights.” (citations omitted)). 
 
736 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 705 
notions of state sovereignty inherent in the Tenth Amendment.169  Jus-
tice O’Connor has also suggested that limitations may be found in the 
Twenty-first Amendment.170
On the other hand, the Court has also noted that certain enumer-
ated powers may simply overlap, and in those situations, restrictions 
on the exercise of one power do not constrain Congress’s ability to act 
pursuant to another.171  For instance, the Court found that Congress 
could circumvent the limitations of the Tax Clause—that all taxes be 
“for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States”172—by enacting tax legislation through the Commerce 
Clause.173  This view, that the General Welfare Clause did not limit the 
Commerce Clause, is especially significant given the close parallel be-
tween the General Welfare Clause and the Promote Progress 
Clause.174  In both cases, the Constitution grants Congress the power 
to achieve an abstract goal and delineates a particular method by 
which that ultimate goal might be achieved.  Thus, just as the Su-
 
169 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985) 
(noting that states “occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system 
and that the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect 
that position”). 
170 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 218 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he regulation of the age of the purchasers of liquor . . . falls squarely within the 
scope of those powers reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment.” (citation 
omitted)).  The majority resolved the issue under the Spending Power and thus did 
not reach the issue of the Twenty-first Amendment.  Id. at 206. 
171 The question of whether two grants of power overlap or if one limits the other 
is generally resolved by an inquiry into whether an enumerated power contains an “af-
firmative” or “positive” limitation.  See Nachbar, supra note 72, at 294-98; see also Paul J. 
Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:  The Intellectual Property 
Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (drawing a 
distinction between those cases in which Congress “runs into barriers” from those in 
which “Congress’s power just runs out”). 
172 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
173 See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884) (holding 
that Congress had the power to pass a law regulating immigration under its commerce 
power and did not violate any other part of the Constitution in doing so).  The case 
remains viable for the proposition that taxes not levied for the “‘common defence and 
general welfare’” are not an exercise of “‘the taxing power’” but rather “‘the mere in-
cident of the regulation of commerce.’”  Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Utility Comm’n, 
899 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595). 
174 See Walterscheid, supra note 157.  Admittedly, this argument relies on stale case 
law, as the 1913 ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment provided Congress with a 
broad taxing power unrestrained by the General Welfare Clause.  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has held that the General Welfare Clause should be viewed as a “grant 
of power” rather than as “a limitation upon congressional power.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976). 
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preme Court has found that taxes enacted outside the scope of the 
General Welfare Clause may nevertheless be permissible under the 
Commerce Clause, the door might similarly be open for copyright 
protection beyond the Intellectual Property Clause to be properly jus-
tified under the Commerce Clause.
Professor Thomas Nachbar has argued for the general proposition 
that the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses should be 
viewed as overlapping grants of power and that the explicit constraints 
in the Intellectual Property Clause should not be viewed as “affirma-
tive” limitations on other enumerated powers.175  However, he never-
theless concedes that “there is a stronger textual argument for apply-
ing the ‘limited Times’ restriction to the whole of Section 8 than there 
is for any of the Intellectual Property Clause’s other limits.”176  Other 
scholars have similarly concluded that the Commerce Clause may not 
be used to circumvent the “limited Times” provision.177
By most indications, such a move would be met with judicial skep-
ticism as well.  Already, the Eleventh Circuit, analyzing an anti-
bootlegging statute passed under the Commerce Clause, suggested in 
dicta that “the Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a limita-
tion in the Copyright Clause if the particular use of the Commerce 
Clause (e.g., the anti-bootlegging statute) were fundamentally incon-
sistent with the particular limitation in the Copyright Clause (e.g., the 
fixation requirement).”178
 
175 Nachbar, supra note 72, at 297. 
176 Id. 
177 See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 162, at 270-99 (arguing that the Commerce Clause 
cannot be used to grant exclusive rights in a way that undermines the explicit “limited 
Times” language in the Promote Progress Clause); see also Heald & Sherry, supra note 
171 (arguing that the individual constraints of the Intellectual Property Clause may not 
be circumvented through the use of other enumerated powers). 
178 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999).  Al-
though this portion of the opinion states that the fixation requirement is inherently 
contained in the Constitution’s use of the term “Writings,” elsewhere the court notes 
that it is assuming this position arguendo but deciding the case on other grounds.  Id. at 
1277; see also supra note 72 (discussing the fixation requirement). 
 The Southern District of New York more directly confronted the issue of whether 
the anti-bootlegging statute could be supported by the Commerce Clause and con-
cluded that it could not.  See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424-29 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding the anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional because it di-
rectly violates both the Copyright Clause’s fixation and durational restrictions). 
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Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the anti-bootlegging 
statute,179 and courts have been similarly generous in their appraisal of 
Congress’s ability to provide copyright-like protection via the Com-
merce Clause, most notably with the DMCA.180  Despite substantial 
skepticism,181 courts have consistently upheld the statute in the face of 
constitutional challenges arguing that its protection violates the Arti-
cle I, Section 8 “limited Times” constraint.182
Moreover, courts have recognized in other contexts that the Intel-
lectual Property Clause does not act as a restraint on Congress’s other 
powers.  For example, in Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit held that the Intellectual Property Clause, by empow-
ering Congress to promote progress through the grant of patents and 
copyrights, did not prevent Congress from promoting progress 
through other means, such as government sponsorship of research 
and development.183
Finally, there is a fundamental structural constraint on the term 
“limited Times.”  Congress is not simply empowered to grant copy-
rights, but rather “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts,”184 with the ability to secure copyrights “for limited Times”185 pro-
vided as a means to that end.186  Thus, if Congress were explicitly act-
ing to pursue a different philosophical end, such as protecting the 
179 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (“[W]e reject Moghadam’s constitutional chal-
lenge, and therefore affirm Moghadam’s conviction.”).  Contra Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 
2d at 429-30 (concluding that the anti-bootlegging statute is unconstitutional). 
180 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); see supra notes 66-67 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the DMCA). 
181 See, e.g., Joshua Schwartz, Thinking Outside the Pandora’s Box:  Why the DMCA Is 
Unconstitutional Under Article 1, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 93, 96 
(2005) (arguing that, by allowing copyright holders to prevent the public from ever 
copying a work, the DMCA is in “direct contravention of the limited times” provision 
of the Constitution).
182 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444-45 (2d Cir. 
2001) (refusing to disturb the district court’s grant of an injunction under the DMCA 
despite appellants’ challenge based on the Copyright Clause); United States v. Elcom 
Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137-42 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding the DMCA against a 
constitutional challenge because it was within Congress’s commerce power and was not 
irreconcilably inconsistent with any provision of the Intellectual Property Clause). 
183 848 F.2d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Ample constitutional power for Gov-
ernment funding of research and development can be found in art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (pro-
vide for the common Defense and general Welfare), cl. 3 (Commerce), cl. 12 (Army), 
cl. 13 (Navy) and cl. 18 (necessary and proper clause).”). 
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
185 Id. 
186 Walterscheid, supra note 157, at 125. 
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‘moral rights’ of artists,187 then the “limited Times” constraint would 
not necessarily be applicable.188
Promulgating an indefinitely renewable copyright scheme under 
the Commerce Clause would philosophically harmonize the system 
with the modified conception of copyright protection proposed in 
Part III, which measures the metes and bounds of that protection 
solely by analyzing the market substitution effects of potentially in-
fringing works.  Moreover, a Commerce Clause scheme would be 
more or less limited to governing only those works sold through 
channels of interstate commerce,189 which would be a minuscule frac-
tion of the works that currently receive federal protection through 
statutes promulgated pursuant to the Intellectual Property Clause.  
Thus, a Commerce Clause copyright system could act concurrently 
with the current Intellectual Property Clause copyright framework, 
with qualifying works eligible for protection under either statutory 
scheme. 
At its heart, indefinitely renewable copyright hinges on the find-
ing that extending the duration of protection would promote the con-
sequentialist goals of copyright law.  The ultimate purpose of the Lim-
ited Times Clause is, after all, to provide Congress with the power to 
satisfy the utilitarian Promote Progress Clause.190  Thus, whether an 
indefinitely renewable copyright scheme were to be promulgated un-
der either the Intellectual Property Clause or the Commerce Clause, 
187 See supra note 63 (discussing ‘moral rights’). 
188 See Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws:  Hearings on S. 1198 and S. 1253 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st 
Cong. 38-39 (1989) (statement of Edward J. Damich, Associate Professor, George Ma-
son University) (arguing that ‘moral rights’ do not fall under the auspices of the Intel-
lectual Property Clause and thus could be granted for an infinite duration); Edward J. 
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990:  Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Pro-
tection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 993 (1990) (“[A]lthough the Copyright 
Clause of the United States Constitution speaks of ‘limited times,’ moral rights argua-
bly are not strictly copyright rights, that is, economic rights.  Therefore, moral rights 
could last in perpetuity.  Furthermore, insofar as moral rights protection indirectly 
benefits art preservation, perpetual protection is appropriate.”). 
189 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000) (discussing the limits 
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 558-59 (1995) (same). 
190 The meaning of “progress” nevertheless remains subject to dispute, with both 
authors and putative infringers claiming that their use of a copyrighted work furthers 
the ultimate goal of the Clause.  See John D. Shuff & Geoffrey T. Holtz, Copyright Ten-
sions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON L. REV. 555, 555-56 (2001) (explaining that authors ar-
gue that copyright provides an economic incentive to create works and that infringers 
argue that progress is promoted by the most widespread public dissemination of 
works). 
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there would be a strong structural argument against binding Congress 
to a narrow interpretation of  “limited Times” that undermined its 
ability to simultaneously benefit both copyright owners and content 
users.  If one were to accept that these two clauses were in conflict, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the “limited Times” constraint 
should be interpreted in a manner subservient to the Promote Pro-
gress Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright law is evolving along several clear axes.  Based on its 
current trajectories, the duration of protection will continue to grow 
while the fourth factor will increasingly dominate fair use analysis.  
These trends should be carried out to their ultimate bounds, in a 
scheme that permits copyrights to be renewed an unlimited number 
of times, but provides protection only against works that would act as 
market substitutes for the original.  Such a framework presents nu-
merous advantages over the current system, especially if Congress con-
tinues its practice of granting retroactive copyright extensions each 
time the extant term is about to expire.  Ultimately, the proposed 
schema seeks to maximize social wealth by reconceptualizing and real-
locating the rights associated with copyright protection, providing 
both copyright owners and content users with increased protection for 
the rights that they value most.  
